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In the beginning 
 In 1979 Pope John Paul II warned the Irish people of the challenges of life in 
the late 20th century:  materialism, affluence, self-indulgence and consumerism.  Yet, 
the Irish were among the poorest in Europe.  Materialism, affluence, consumerism, 
and self-indulgence were all things more dreamed of than experienced.  Ireland was 
the sick man of Europe.  The statistics are staggering.  GDP per capita was 69% of the 
European average.  Personal income tax rates were extortionate.  Government debt 
exceeded 100% of GNP.  The cost of servicing that debt was 13% of GNP.  In 1985 
the real interest rate was 10.5%; unemployment 17.3%; inflation 5.4%.  The 
exchange rate for the first half of the decade was significantly overvalued.  During the 
1980s 10% of the population emigrated, seeking a better life for themselves and for 
those they left behind.  The Church’s admonitions notwithstanding, those Irish who 
had not yet abandoned hope yearned for a better quality of life. 
 
The Miracle of Lazarus 
 From the ashes of the 1980s there arose a New Ireland.  The miraculous 
transformation began around 1990.  By 2000 Irish GDP per capita was at the 
European average;  by 2003 it was 136%.  New Ireland was a prosperous country.  It 
attracted migrants from every continent on the globe who came in pursuit of a better 
life.  It was characterized by fiscal rectitude.  It was a country of peerless, export-led 
growth.  It was becoming a more secular, materialistic, and self-indulgent country.  It 
was affluent.  It was envied and emulated.  These sociological and economic changes 
were swift and pervasive.  There was indeed a New Ireland.  It did not mourn the Old 
Ireland.  No whiff of the grave clung to this exuberant, self-confident country.  
 The resurrection of Ireland has been attributed to a number of factors, among 
which were sensible government policies, falling interest rates, the openness and 
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flexibility of the economy, favourable exchange rates, European Union subsidies, the 
European Single Market, FDI, a ready supply of highly skilled workers, competitive 
wages, a surge in labour force participation rates, and Social Partnership.  The 
miraculous growth was fuelled more by increased inputs than by increased 
productivity of existing inputs, but it was miraculous nonetheless.  Government 
policies were instrumental in marshalling these resources.  But, the unique confluence 
of events that had made it possible could not be duplicated.   
 When the boom ended in the early 2000s the Government faced significant 
policy challenges.  The demographic effect was spent, skilled workers were among 
the most expensive in Europe, other countries had improved their success in attracting 
FDI, EU subsidies disappeared as wealth rose, the Single Market effect was a one off, 
and Ireland, now in the Euro area, had no independent control over its currency.  All it 
had was taxation and expenditure policy to entice additional FDI and spur growth and 
Social Partnership to promote social harmony and industrial peace and to “reinvent” 
Ireland (O’Donnell, 1999). 
 The practice and rhetoric of Social Partnership suggests that all, unions, 
employers, government, as well as representatives of the Chambers of Commerce, 
Small and Medium Enterprises, farmers, and community and voluntary groups 
including representatives of the Church, were in this project together.  While only the 
government, unions and employers were directly involved in wage negotiations, the 
other groups lent their voices to discussions on social and economic policies.  This 
meant that the triennial Social Partnership agreements and the infiltration of 
Partnership into all aspects of Irish life represented a joint project in the development 
of New Ireland and defined what was special about the New Irish Model.  The 
government was central to this since it could agree to public sector wage packages 
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thereby setting the tone and parameters for private sector agreements.  Further, it 
could influence the possible outcomes via its taxation and expenditure policies.  It 
could also keep the community and voluntary sector engaged by listening and 
responding to their wants and needs.  All this was possible as long as tax revenues 
continued to grow at a healthy rate. 
 This process of wage and socio-economic policy determination was one of 
inclusion.  It was collaborative, us and us, rather than adversarial, us vs. them.  Its 
goal was to make everyone better off.  It represented what was right and good about 
the Irish Model.  Social Partnership made the Irish economy and the New Ireland 
different, an exemplar of what could be in the globalized, cut-throat-competitive 
world economy of the 21st century.   
 
Eat, Drink and be Merry 
The Irish people embraced New Ireland wholeheartedly.  Ireland had finally met 
Mammon and liked what she saw.  The materialism, affluence, consumerism, and 
self-indulgence that Pope John Paul II had warned against were celebrated.  
Conspicuous consumption became the norm.  Profligacy was the order of the day.  
The Irish leaped onto the property ladder and then added to their property portfolios.  
New cars choked the roads, and new roads were demanded to accommodate them.  
Banks financed these acquisitions even when a borrower’s current income would not, 
in less bountiful times, have justified the loans.  The boom was a rising tide that lifted 
all boats.  Real incomes were growing across the income distribution (Nolan, 2006).  
The poor were made rich.  Those who had never had money to spend now had money, 
a good job and good prospects.  The Irish were materially better off than they ever 
had been before.  Past poverty was forgotten.   
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 As the influence of Mammon increased, that of the Church fell.  It was mired 
in child abuse scandals and so found it difficult to articulate a message from the moral 
high ground.  It was unable to effectively argue against the value of wealth in this life, 
since wealth was accompanied by better health and well-being even if spiritual 
sustenance was no longer sought at its door.  For too long had the Irish been promised 
the treasures of heaven to compensate them for the material deprivations of their lives 
here on earth.  The treasures of earth, now finally enjoyed, were not to be discarded.  
The Church, an important feature in Ireland’s past, was not a major player in New 
Ireland (Inglis, 1998).  It no longer spoke to or for Ireland.   
 
Voices in the Wilderness 
 In the early 2000s, although the source of growth changed from exports to 
property, growth continued, this time fuelled by low interest rates, an international 
liquidity glut, generous lending by banks, and generous tax relief on property 
investment.  Initially exchange rates were favourable, buoying up the export sector, 
but the euro soon strengthened.  Economic growth kept tax revenues growing, and 
expenditures increased accordingly.  While the government appeared to be fiscally 
prudent, its policies, like the current boom, were unsustainable.   
 The economic situation at the turn of the century should have raised concern.  
Average real hourly wages had risen by 20% over the decade of the 1990s 
outstripping productivity growth.  By 2002 Irish workers were the third most 
expensive in the EU.  The housing bubble led to substantial GDP growth, but it hid 
the reality that productivity gains were an artefact of the bubble not of increases in 
productive efficiency.  The construction sector was crowding out the export sector, 
degrading worker skills as young people opted for high income in construction rather 
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than for higher education.  It also hid significant problems in the tax code.  Revenues 
from transaction taxes, such as capital gains and stamp duty, were growing at a rate 
that allowed for further cuts to income tax rates and increases in tax relief.  With tax 
revenues climbing and the economy growing the impetus for change was weak.  
Times were still good and the Government could continue to support policies beloved 
of the Social Partners, to appear fiscally prudent, and to disparage those voices urging 
restraint as well as those threatening Armageddon.  The day of reckoning could be 
deferred.   
 Those questioning the sustainability of government policy and economic 
growth were not sanguine.   Early warnings came in 2001 from both the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank (Scharrer, 2001).  They reprimanded 
Ireland for an overly inflationary fiscal policy.  But, then Finance Minister McCreevy 
refused to alter the budget.  The benchmarking exercise that increased public sector 
wages by about 9% above the increases agreed in the Social Partnership negotiations 
was also questioned.  The concern expressed was that these extraordinary wage 
increases would further diminish Irish competitiveness (Fitz Gerald, 2002; Ruane and 
Lyons, 2002; O’Leary, 2002).  These warnings were largely dismissed.  The time was 
not yet ripe for hard decisions.  
The National Competitiveness Council (NCC 2006) reminded the Government 
that to sustain growth productivity had to continue to rise.  It suggested a means to 
achieve this end.  But, as its analysis was not uniformly negative, it was the positive 
that was seized upon.   
Also dismissed as unduly negative were the ever more strident warnings that 
the construction bubble was unsustainable and that banks were overexposed to the 
property market (Economist 2005; Malzubris, 2008)).  Those voicing these opinions 
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were admonished for scaremongering and talking down ‘a robust and fundamentally 
sound economy’.  The Government did have supporters in high places, such as the 
IMF (2007) or the OECD (2008).    This support allowed for hard decisions to 
continue to be deferred.     
 
Day of Judgement  
 Fianna Fail was returned to power in 2007 as the party best able to shepherd 
the economy into the future.  Continued, if slower, growth was promised.  The 
property sector would make a soft landing.  Electioneering over, the Irish economy, 
perhaps less exposed to world financial woes, was found to be critically over-exposed 
to itself.  This economy that had boomed by exporting to the world had again boomed 
by selling houses to itself, houses now in excess supply.  Moreover, the world 
economy was in dire straits. The world financial system was closed for business.  
 The Government was in a fix.  The tax revenues it relied upon had plummeted.  
Had it prepared for the inevitable rainy day while the sun was shining by improving 
the tax code, increasing income tax rates on corporations and individuals, introducing 
a value-based property tax, reducing reliance on transactions taxes, and/or imposing 
productivity enhancing work rules on civil and public servants, its problems would 
have been fewer.  But there had not been the will.  What was missing was not the 
desire to ensure a better future, but the willingness to do the hard work and make the 
sacrifices needed to get there. Hard work and sacrifice were not in the New Irish 
lexicon. 
The Government had to face the crisis.  It did so with the presumed support of 
the Social Partners.  The Government declared that New Ireland was strong and 
resilient enough to ride out this storm.  Things were bad, but they had been bad 
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before.   The Irish had survived.  They would survive again.  But, initial stumbles, 
such as revoking medical cards of the over-70s, strained the fabric of Social 
Partnership.  Further strains rent the fabric as private sector workers took pay cuts and 
lost jobs while public sector workers were sheltered from the economic realities.  
Pension levies on the public sector carried little weight since private sector wage had 
already fallen and the viability of many pension systems questioned.  The social fabric 
is now in shreds as the reality of the McCarthy report sinks in.  While the Government 
still calls on the Social Partners to work together for a better future, what had 
underpinned Social Partnership is already lost.  There is no longer a common purpose 
had there ever been one.  With ever larger surpluses having turned into ever larger 
deficits, Social Partnership has collapsed leaving all the Partners looking out for 
number one.   
As the economy staggers, the Church, which has fallen from great heights of 
power and prosperity and still struggles to stand, counsels charity.  Preaching from its 
humbled and diminished state, perhaps it will be heard by a humbled and diminished 
Ireland that may finally take the hard, long-deferred decisions and choose to embrace 
a sustainable model of economic, social and spiritual prosperity in the mature 
knowledge that life, of an individual or a nation, does not consist in the abundance of 
one’s possessions. 
   
 
 
References 
Fitz Gerald, J. 2002. The Macro-Economic Implications of Changes in Public Service 
Pay Rates. Quarterly Economic Commentary. Winter: 43-58. 
 
 7
 8
Hear that Hissing Sound? 2005. The Economist. 8 December. 
 
IMF. 2007. Country Report No. 07/325. September 2007. 
 
Inglis, T. 1998. Moral Monopoly: The Rise and Fall of the Catholic Church in 
Modern Ireland. UCD Press, 2nd Revised edition. 
 
John Paul II. 1979. Homily, Phoenix Park. 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/homilies/1979/documents/hf_j
p-ii_hom_19790929_irlanda-dublino_en.html 
 
Malzubris, J. 2008.  Ireland's housing market: bubble trouble.  ECFIN Country Focus. 
5(9): 1-7. 
 
National Competitiveness Council. 2006. Overview of Ireland’s Productivity 
Performance, 1980-2005 
 
Nolan, B. 2006. Trends in Income Inequality in Ireland. Public Lecture.  14 March 
2006. 
 
O’Donnell, R. 1999. Reinventing Ireland:  From Sovereignty to Partnership. Jean 
Monnet Inaugural Lecture UCD. 29 April. 
 
O’Leary, J. 2002. Benchmarking the Benchmarkers. Quarterly Economic 
Commentary. Winter: 77-91. 
 
OECD. 2008. OECD Economic Surveys – Ireland 2008. April. 
 
Ruane, F., Lyons, R. 2002. Wage Determination in the Irish Economy. Quarterly 
Economic Commentary. Winter: 59-76. 
 
Scharrer, H-E. 2001. Ireland Out of Step. Interneconomics. 36(2):57-8. 
